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Abstract Tzeng et al. proposed a threshold multi-proxy multi-signature scheme with threshold
verification. Recently, Hsu et al. pointed out that Tzeng et al.’s scheme was vulnerable to insider attacks
and proposed an improvement to eliminate the pointed out security leak. We will show that Hsu et al.’s
improvement cannot resist the frame attack. That is, after intercepting a valid proxy signature, an
adversary can change the original signers to himself, and forge a proxy signature. To remedy thisweakness,
we will propose a new method.
© 2012 Sharif University of Technology. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
In 1996, Mambo et al. [1] first introduced the concept of a
proxy signature. A proxy signature scheme allows an original
signer to delegate its signing power to a designated person,
called the proxy signer, who can generate the proxy signature
of a message on behalf of the original signer. The verifier can
verify and distinguish between the original signature and the
proxy signature at the verification stage.
In a (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme, the proxy
secret key, generated by an original signer, is shared among
a proxy group of n proxy signers delegated by the original
signer. In a proxy group, any t or more proxy signers can
cooperatively recover the proxy secret to generate a valid proxy
signature, but any t − 1 or less proxy signer cannot [2–6]. A
secure (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme should satisfy
the following security requirements: secrecy, proxy protection,
unforgeability, nonrepudiation, time constraint and known
signers.
In all previous schemes, a single random verifier is adopted
to verify the soundness of the ultimate signature. However,
as Tzeng et al. [7] indicated, in many special applications,
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tween two companies, only specified verifiers have access to
authenticate the proxy signature. In 2004, Tzeng et al. [7] pro-
posed a non-repudiable threshold multi-proxy multi-signature
scheme with shared verification. A threshold multi-proxy
multi-signature scheme with shared verification allows a sub-
set of original signers to delegate the signing power to a des-
ignated group of proxy signers. A valid proxy signature can be
generated by a subset of the proxy signers delegated by the orig-
inal signer group for a designated group of verifiers. The validity
of the proxy signature can be verified by a subset of the desig-
nated verifiers [7]. As Tzeng et al. [7] indicated, the concepts
and models proposed by them are very useful in many situa-
tions, especially when specific verifiers are needed. That is, only
some specified verifiers can authenticate the authenticity of the
proxy signature. However, their scheme was insecure.
In order to create a secure non-repudiable threshold multi-
proxy multi-signature scheme with shared verification, the
following security requirements should be satisfied for the
proxy signature:
Secrecy. The original signers’ private keys are very important.
They must be kept secret. If they are discovered, the security
of the system is ruined. Therefore, the systemmust ensure that
the private keys never get derived from any information, such
as the sharing of the proxy signing key or the original signers’
public keys. Furthermore, no proxy signers should be able to
cooperatively derive the original signers’ private keys.
Proxy protection. Only the delegated proxy signer can generate
valid partial proxy signatures. Even the original signers cannot
create partial signatures.
evier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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cooperatively generated by t1 or more original signers. This
means that valid proxy shares cannot be created by t1−1 or less
original signers, or any third parties who are not designated as
original signers.
Unforgeability.Avalid proxy signature can only be cooperatively
generated by t2 or more proxy signers. This means that valid
proxy signatures cannot be created by t2 − 1 or less proxy
signers, or any third parties who are not designated as proxy
signers.
(t3, n3) threshold verifying. The validity of the generated proxy
signature can only be verified by any t3 or more verifiers out
of n3 designated verifiers. Hence, t3 − 1 or fewer designated
verifiers cannot check the validity of the generated proxy
signature.
Non-repudiation. Any valid proxy signature must be generated
by t2 or more proxy signers. Therefore, proxy signers cannot
deny that they have signed themessage. In addition, the original
signers cannot deny having delegated the power of signing
messages to the proxy signers.
Time constraint. The proxy signing keys can be used during the
delegated period only. Once they expire, the proxy signatures
generated by using those keys become invalid.
Known signers. From a proxy signature, the identities of the
actual original signers and the identities of actual signers can
be determined.
In 2005, Bao et al. [8] pointed out that Tzeng et al.’s
scheme [7]was vulnerable to frame attacks. In their attack, after
intercepting a valid proxy signature generated by the subset of
a proxy group, an adversary could change the warrant,mW , and
forge new proxy signatures. Therefore, the properties of proxy
protection and unforgeability were not fulfilled in Tzeng et al.’s
scheme. To remedy thisweakness, Bao et al. also gave a new im-
provement. Two years later, Xie et al. [9] showed that Bao et al.’s
scheme cannot resist a proxy relationship inversion attack. In
their attack, the proxy group, in collusionwith t3 verifiers, could
forge a valid proxy signature. This forged signature seems to be
generated by the original group on behalf of the proxy group.
Xie et al. also proposed a new improvement. Subsequently, Hsu
et al. [10] also pointed out that Tzeng et al.’s scheme [7] was
vulnerable to insider attacks, that is, any verifier could check
the validity of the proxy signature by himself without the aid of
other verifiers. Therefore, Tzeng et al.’s scheme could not sat-
isfy the property of (t3, n3) threshold verifying. Hsu et al. [10]
also proposed an improvement to eliminate the pointed out se-
curity leak. However, in 2009, Kang et al. [11] pointed out that
both improved schemes proposed in [8,10] were insecure. Kang
et al. [11] mentioned that [8] was also vulnerable to insider
attacks, and [7,8,10] could not satisfy the property of (t1, n1)
threshold delegating. To remedy these weaknesses, they made
a new improvement, which was more secure than all the previ-
ous schemes mentioned above.
In this paper, we show that Hsu et al.’s scheme [10] still has
some security weakness, which cannot resist the frame attack.
As a result, it cannot satisfy the properties of proxy protection
and unforgeability. Besides, we propose a new secure and prac-
tical non-repudiable threshold multi-proxy multi-signature
scheme with shared verification. Our improved scheme has the
following advantages over the scheme presented in [10].
• In our scheme, similar to Kang et al.’s scheme, each original
signer randomly generates a t1 − 1 degree polynomial and
all original signers collectively generate an original signergroup secret key. Thus, any t1 or more original signer can
cooperate to derive the original signer group secret key and
delegate the signing capability to the proxy group, but any
t1 − 1 or less original signer cannot delegate the signing
capability. This meets the security requirement of (t1, n1)
threshold delegating.
• In our improved scheme, similar to [8,11], the warrant,mW ,
is part of the partial signature. Hence, our scheme can resist
the frame attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2,
we briefly review Hsu et al.’s scheme [10]. In Section 3, our
cryptanalysis on Hsu et al.’s scheme is given out. We introduce
the new improvement in Section 4. The security properties of
the proposed scheme are discussed in Section 5. Finally, we
draw our conclusions in Section 6.
2. Brief review of Hsu et al.’s scheme
This scheme consists of five phases: initialization, secret
share generation, proxy share generation, proxy signature gen-
eration, and proxy signature verification. The system parame-
ters and corresponding notations are defined as follows:
• p: a large public prime such that p − 1 has a large prime
factor.
• q: a large public prime factor of p− 1.
• g: a public integer of order q in Z∗p .• h(.): a public one-way hash function.
• ∥: the concatenation of strings.
• GO = {O1,O2, . . . ,On1}: the original signer group of n1
original signers.
• GP = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn2}: the proxy signer group of n2 proxy
signers.
• GV = {V1, V2, . . . , Vn3}: the verifier group of n3 designated
verifiers.
• mW : a warrant which records the identities of the group
members in GO, GP and GV , the parameters (t1, n1), (t2, n2),
(t3, n3) and the valid delegation time, etc.
• AOSID: the identities of the actual original signers.
• APSID: the identities of the actual proxy signers.
• xOi ∈ Z∗q: the secret key of Oi selected by him/herself.
• yOi = gxOimod p: the certified public key of Oi.• xPi ∈ Z∗q: the secret key of Pi selected by him/herself.
• yPi = gxPimod p: the certified public key of Pi.• xVi ∈ Z∗q: the secret key of Vi selected by him/herself.
• yVi = gxVimod p: the certified public key of Vi.• XP ∈ Z∗q: the proxy group private key.• XV ∈ Z∗q: the verifier group private key.
• YP = gXPmod p: the certified public key of GP .
• YV = gXVmod p: the certified public key of GV .
• CA: a certificate authority that certified all public keys.
• SDC: a share distribution center.
SDC selects p, q, g , and h(.) and determines (XP , YP) and
(XV , YV ).
2.1. Secret share generation phase
SDC randomly chooses fp(x) and fv(x) for GP and GV ,
respectively, where:
fp(x) = XP + ap,1x+ · · · + ap,t2−1xt2−1mod q,
fv(x) = XV + av,1x+ · · · + av,t3−1xt3−1mod q.
676 S. Mashhadi / Scientia Iranica, Transactions D: Computer Science & Engineering and Electrical Engineering 19 (2012) 674–679Then, SDC computes Pi’s secret share as αPi = fp(yPi) and its
corresponding public key βPi = gαPimod p. In the same way,
SDC computes the secret share and its corresponding public key
for Vj ∈ GV , as αVj = fp(yVj) and βVj = gαVjmod p, respectively.
2.2. Proxy share generation phase
Without loss of generality, let DO = {O1,O2, . . . ,Ot1}. To
delegate the signing capability, DO acts as follows:
1. Each Oi ∈ DO chooses a random number, ki ∈ Z∗q , and broad-
casts Ki = gkimod p to other signers in DO and a designated
clerk (DC).
2. After receiving Kj( j = 1, 2, . . . , t1; j ≠ i), each Oi ∈ DO
computes K =t1i=1 Kimod p, and σOi = kiK + xOih(K∥mW∥
AOSID)mod q.
3. Each Oi ∈ DO sends partial proxy share σOi to DC.
After receiving all partial proxy shares, DC performs the
following steps to generate a valid proxy share σ :
1. Compute σO =t1i=1 σOimod q.
2. Check gσO = KK t1i=1 yh(K∥mW ∥AOSID)Oi mod p, compute the
proxy share σ as σ = t−12 σOmod q, and broadcast (σ ,mW ,
K , AOSID) to GP .
2.3. Proxy signature generation phase
The validity of (σ ,mW , K , AOSID) is verified by each Pi ∈ GP
by checking that:
gσ =

KK
t1
i=1
yh(K∥mW ∥AOSID)Oi
t−12
mod p.
Without loss of generality, let DP = {P1, P2, . . . , Pt2}. In order
to create a threshold proxy signature on amessage,m, DP act as
follows:
1. Each Pi ∈ DP randomly chooses a number, ωi ∈ Z∗q , and
broadcasts rPi = gωimod p to other proxy signers in DP and
DC.
2. Each Pi ∈ DP computes and broadcast r ′Pi = (YV )ωi+αPi LPi
mod p, where LPi =
t2
j=1,j≠i(−yPj)(yPi − yPj)−1mod q.
3. Each Pi ∈ GP computes R = t2i=1 rPimod p, R′ = t2i=1 r ′Pi
mod p, and:
si = R′αPiLPi + ωiR+ (σ + xPi)h(R∥R′∥APSID∥m)mod q.
Here, si is the individual signature, which is sent to DC.
After receiving all valid si, DC computes S =t2i=1 simod q and
checks the validity of S and si by the following equalities:
gS = Y R′P RR

KK
t1
i=1
yh(K∥mW ∥AOSID)Oi
t2
j=1
yPj
h(R∥R′∥APSID∥m)
mod p, and
g si = βPiR
′LPi rPi
R
×
KK t1
i=1
yh(K∥mW ∥AOSID)Oi
t−12
yPi
h(R∥R
′∥APSID∥m)
mod p.
Then, the proxy signature ofm is (mW , K , AOSID, R, S, APSID).2.4. Proxy signature verification phase
Without loss of generality, let DV = {V1, V2, . . . , Vt3}. They
can verify the validity of the threshold proxy signature by the
following performance:
1. According to mW , AOSID and APSID, each verifier gets the
public keys of the original signers and proxy signers from
the CA, knows who the actual original signers and the actual
proxy signers are, and the threshold parameters (t1, n1),
(t2, n2), (t3, n3), etc.
2. Each Vi ∈ DV computes and sends r ′Vi = (RYP)αVi LVimod p,
to other verifiers in DV where LVi =
t3
j=1,j≠i(−yVj)(yVi −
yVj)
−1mod q.
3. Each Vi ∈ DV computes t3i=1 r ′Vi = R′, and verifies the
validity of the proxy signature (mW , K , AOSID, R, S, APSID)
for the message,m, by the following equality:
gS = YP R′RR(VOVP)h(R∥R′∥APSID∥m)mod p,
where VO = KK t1i=1 yh(K∥mW ∥AOSID)Oi and VP =t2j=1 yPj .
3. Security leak of Hsu et al.’s scheme
Recently, Bao et al. [8] presented a frame attack on [7].
Subsequently, Xie et al. [9] showed that [8] cannot resist the
proxy relationship inversion attack.
Here, by a combination of the two attacks mentioned above,
we will propose a new frame attack on Hsu et al.’s scheme [10].
Assume that (mW , K , AOSID, R, S, APSID) is a valid proxy
signature ofmessagem generated byDp on behalf ofDO. Let B =
{B1, B2, . . . , Bn} be an adversary (Bi can be any participant) and
B′ be an arbitrary subset of B of order t , (B′ ⊆ B, card(B′) = t ,
and t, n are arbitrary). Let IDB and IDB′ be the identities of B and
B′, respectively. B′, in collusionwith t3 verifiersDV , can generate
a valid proxy signature (m′W , K ′, IDB′, R, S ′, APSID) for message
m, such that any arbitrary t3 or more verifiers, D′V , verify that
(m′W , K ′, IDB′, R, S ′, APSID) is generated by DP on behalf of B′.
In other words, we show that B′ can change DO, t1, and GO
to himself, t , and B, respectively, and generate a valid proxy
signature formessagem. The details of this attack are as follows.
Firstly, DV computes R′ = t3i=1 r ′Vi = t3i=1(RYP)αVi LVimod p
and sends R′ to B′. Then, B′ generates a warrant m′W which
records the identities of the group members in B, GP , and GV ,
the parameters (t, n), (t2, n2), (t3, n3) and the valid delegation
time, etc. Then, any Bi ∈ B′ executes the following steps:
1. Choose a random a′i ∈ Z∗q and broadcast k′i = ga
′
imod p to
other players in B′;
2. After receiving k′j ( j = 1, 2, . . . , t; j ≠ i), each Bi ∈ B′
computes:
K ′ =
t
i=1
k′imod p,
and:
σBi = a′iK ′ + xBih(K ′∥m′W∥IDB′)mod q,
where xBi is the secret key of Bi.
3. Compute σB′ =ti=1 σBimod q.
4. B′ computes S ′ = (σB′ − t2σ)h(R∥R′∥APSID∥m)+ S.
5. Finally, B′ forges an illegal proxy signature (m′W , K ′, IDB′, R,
S ′, APSID), and it seems to be generated by the proxy group
DP on behalf of B′.
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validity of the proxy signature (m′W , K ′, IDB′, R, S ′, APSID). They
compute

Vi∈D′V r
′
Vi
= R′, and check whether the following
equation holds or not.
gS
′ = YP R′RR

K ′K
′ 
Bi∈B′
y
h(K ′∥m′W ∥IDB′)
Bi
t2
j=1
yPj
h(R∥R′∥APSID∥m)
mod p.
The forged proxy signature (m′W , K ′, IDA, R, S ′, APSID) can pass
the verification equation because:
gS
′ = gSg(σB′−t2σ)h(R∥R′∥APSID∥m)
= g
t2
i=1 sig(σB′−t2σ)h(R∥R
′∥APSID∥m)
= g(
t2
i=1 R′αPi LPi+ωiR+(σ+xPi )h(R∥R′∥APSID∥m))+(σB′−t2σ)h(R∥R′∥APSID∥m)
= g(
t2
i=1 R′αPi LPi+ωiR+xPi h(R∥R′∥APSID∥m))+σB′ h(R∥R′∥APSID∥m)
= gXPR′g
t2
i=1 ωiR(g
t2
i=1 xPi g
t
i=1 a′iK ′+xBi h(K ′∥m′W ∥IDB′))h(R∥R
′∥APSID∥m)
= Y R′P RR

K ′K
′ t
i=1
yBi
h(K ′∥m′W ∥IDB′)
t2
i=1
yPi
h(R∥R′∥APSID∥m)
mod p.
Thus, the validity of the forged proxy signature (m′W , K ′, IDB′,
R, S ′, APSID) can be verified by any t3 or more verifiers. The
major problem of Hsu et al.’s scheme [10] is that the proxy
signature generation is independent of the proxy certificate
(mW , AOSID). Therefore, the adversary can easily modify the
proxy signatures by our attack. To guard against this attack,
it is better to integrate proxy signatures with the proxy
certificate (mW , AOSID). Therefore, in our improved scheme,
similar to [8,11], the proxy certificate (mW , AOSID) is part of
h(R∥R′∥AOSID∥APSID∥m∥mW ) in individual signature si. Thus,
after intercepting a valid proxy signature, it is impossible for
anyone to replace (AOSID,mW ) by another (AOSID′,m′W ), and
at the same time, the following equality holds:
h(R∥R′∥AOSID∥APSID∥m∥mW )
= h(R∥R′∥AOSID′∥APSID∥m∥m′W ).
This is because h(.) is a collision resistant hash function.
4. The proposed scheme
Our scheme can be divided into five phases: initializa-
tion, secret share generation, proxy share generation, proxy
signature generation and proxy signature verification. Since
the system parameters are the same as those in Hsu et al.’s
scheme [10], we only describe the remaining phases below.
4.1. Secret share generation phase
SDC performs the same steps as those in Section 2.1. More-
over, in our scheme, all Oi ∈ GO collectively run the following
steps to generate their secret shadows and the original signer
group public key:
1. Each Oi ∈ GO chooses a random number, ai ∈ Z∗q , and
broadcasts gai to other original signers in GO.
2. After receiving gaj ( j = 1, 2, . . . , n1; j ≠ i), each Oi ∈ GO
computes A = n1i=1 gaimod p and randomly generates a
polynomial of degree t1 − 1:
fi(x) = (aiA+ xOi)+ ai,1x+ · · · + ai,t1−1xt1−1mod q.
Oi publishes Ai,l = gai,lmod p(l = 1, 2, . . . , t1 − 1).3. Each Oi ∈ GO computes fi( j) and sends it to Oj ∈ GO via a
secure channel for j ≠ i.
4. After receiving fj(i) from Oj, Oi can validate it by checking:
g fj(i) = gajAyOj
t1−1
l=1
(Aj,l)i
l
mod p.
Let f (x) = n1i=1 fi(x)mod p; then, the secret shadow of Oi
is f (i), and the corresponding public key is determined by
g f (i). The original signer group public key is YO = g f (0) =
AA
n1
i=1 yOimod p. Finally, GO publishes A as public information.
4.2. Proxy share generation phase
Here, we replace σOi with:
σOi = kiK +

xOi + f (i)
t1
j=1, j≠i
−j
i− j

× h(K∥mW∥AOSID)mod q.
Therefore:
gσOi = KiK
yoig f (i)
t1
j=1, j≠i
−j
i−j
h(K∥mW ∥AOSID) ,
and:
gσ = KK

t1
i=1
yOiA
n1
i=1
yOi
h(K∥mW ∥AOSID)
mod p.
Finally, DC broadcasts (σ ,mW , K , A, AOSID) to GP .
4.3. Proxy signature generation phase
In our scheme, si is computed by:
si = R′αPiLPi + ωiR+ (σ + xPi)
× h(R∥R′∥AOSID∥APSID∥m∥mW )mod q.
After receiving all the valid si, the DC computes S = t2i=1 si
mod q and checks the validity of S and si by the following
equalities:
gS = YP R′RR
KKt2  t1
i=1
yOiA
n1
i=1
yOi
t2h(K∥mW ∥AOSID)
×
t2
j=1
yPj
h(R∥R′∥AOSID∥APSID∥m∥mW )
,
and:
g si = βPiR
′LPi rPi
R

KK

t1
i=1
yOiA
×
n1
i=1
yOi
h(K∥mW ∥AOSID)
yPi
h(R∥R′∥AOSID∥APSID∥m∥mW ) .
Then, the proxy signature ofm is (mW , K , AOSID, R, S, APSID).
4.4. Proxy signature verification phase
Here, the validity of the proxy signature (mW , K , AOSID, R, S,
APSID) is checked by the following equality:
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where:
VO = KKt2

t1
i=1
yOiA
A
n1
i=1
yOi
t2h(K∥mW ∥AOSID)
,
and:
VP =
t2
j=1
yPj .
5. Security analysis of our proposed scheme
In this section, we will show that our improved scheme not
only keeps the merits of the previous schemes proposed in
[7,8,10,11], but also overcomes their weaknesses.
(i) First of all, an attacker cannot obtain any original signers’
secret keys xOi from equation yOi = gxOimod p. This is
because of the difficult problem of solving the discrete
logarithm. Similarly, an attacker cannot obtain any proxy
signers’ secret keys, xPi , or any verifiers’ secret keys, xVi ,
from the equation yPi = gxPimod p or yVi = gxVimod p.
Therefore, the property of proxy protection is fulfilled in
our scheme.
(ii) In our scheme, similar to Kang et al.’s scheme, each Oi ∈
GO randomly generates a t1−1 degree polynomial fi(x) =
(aiA+xOi)+ai,1x+· · ·+ai,t1−1xt1−1mod q; and allOi ∈ GO
collectively generate the original signer group secret key,
XO = f (0). Thus, any t1 or more original signers can
cooperate to deriveXO, and delegate the signing capability
to the proxy group, but any t1 − 1 or less original signers
cannot delegate the signing capability. This meets the
security requirement of (t1, n1) threshold delegating.
(iii) Consider the scenario of an insider attack [10]. Suppose
that a malicious verifier, Vi ∈ GV , who participated in val-
idating the valid proxy signature (m1W , K
1, AOSID1, R1, S1,
APSID1) form1 attempts to check the validity of the subse-
quent proxy signature (m2W , K
2, AOSID2, R2, S2, APSID2)
form2 by himself, without the assistance of other verifiers
in GV . After the malicious verifier participates in verifying
the validity of the proxy signature form1, he can derive:
R′ =
t3
i=1
r ′Vi =
t3
i=1
(RYP)αVi LVi = RXV Y XVP
= gXV
t2
i=1 ωiY XVP .
It can be seen that R′ is randomized by random integers
ωi’s, chosen by Pi’s
Therefore, a malicious verifier, Vi ∈ GV , who
participated in validating the proxy signature (m1W ,
K 1, AOSID1, R1, S1, APSID1) for m1 can derive R′1 =
gXV
t2
i=1 ω′iY XVP , but he cannot derive R
′2 = gXV
t2
j=1 ω′′i Y XVP
by himself without the assistance of other verifiers in GV .
Hence, similar to [10,11], our scheme can resist the insider
attack.
(iv) In Section 3, we presented frame attack on Hsu et al.’s
scheme. As Bao and the author have analyzed, this se-
curity leak inherent in [7,10] is caused by the fact that
the individual signature, si, is independent of the proxy
certificate (APSID,mW ). Thus, the adversary can eas-
ily substitute the proxy certificate and frame the in-
nocent proxy signers. In our improved scheme, similarto [8,11], the proxy certificate (AOSID,mW ) is a part of
h(R∥R′∥AOSID∥APSID∥m∥mW ) in individual signature si =
R′αPiLPi + ωiR + (σ + xPi)h(R∥R′∥AOSID∥APSID∥m∥mW ).
Thus, after intercepting a valid proxy signature, it is im-
possible for anyone to replace (AOSID,mW ) by another
(AOSID′,m′W ), and at the same time, the following equal-
ity holds:
h(R∥R′∥AOSID∥APSID∥m∥mW )
= h(R∥R′∥AOSID′∥APSID∥m∥m′W ).
This is because h(.) is a collision resistant hash function.
Hence, our scheme can resist the frame attack.
(v) Consider the collusion attack made by proxy signers. As-
sume that any t2− 1 or fewer proxy signers in GP want to
conspire to sign a message, m. However, they cannot re-
construct the polynomial function fp(x) and further obtain
other proxy signers’ secret shares and the proxy group se-
cret key. Similarly, any t3−1 verifiers or less in the verifier
group cannot obtain any other’s secret shadows. Thus, our
improved scheme can resist the conspiracy attacks made
by proxy signers or verifiers. Moreover, from that which
has been analyzed in (i), (iv), and (v), our scheme satisfies
the properties of proxy protection and unforgeability.
(vi) Consider the collusion attack made by verifiers. Assume
that any t3 − 1 or fewer proxy signers in GV want to con-
spire to verify the validity of a proxy signature. However,
they cannot reconstruct the polynomial function fv(x) and
further obtain other verifiers’ secret shares and the veri-
fier group secret key. Therefore, our new scheme can re-
sist the collusion attack made by verifiers.
Furthermore, as discussed in (iii) and (vi), our scheme
follows the property of (t3, n3) threshold verifying.
(vii) Consider the collusion attack made by original signers.
There are two cases:
• Firstly, assume that any t1 or more original signers in
GO want to conspire to sign any warrant, mW . They all
reveal their proxy private key f (i) and cooperatively
reconstruct the secret polynomial function, f (x) =n1
i=1 fi(x)mod p. They compute the proxy group se-
cret key, XO = f (0). Thus, they can easily derive any
other original signer Oj’s secret shadow f ( j). However,
they cannot obtain each private key, xOj , from yOj =
gxOjmod p and ki from Ki = gki because of the diffi-
cult problem of solving the discrete logarithm. There-
fore, they cannot derive each Oj’s partial signature:
σOi = kiK +

xOi + f (i)
t1
j=1, j≠i
−j
i− j

× h(K∥mW∥AOSID)mod q.
Similarly, they can reveal their proxy private key,
fj(i), and cooperatively reconstruct the secret poly-
nomial function fj(x) = (ajA + xOj) + aj,1x +
· · · + aj,t1−1xt1−1mod q. They compute ajA + xOj =
fj(0), but they cannot obtain each private key, xOj ,
from ajA + xOj without knowing random number aj.
Therefore, they cannot derive each partial signature;
σOi = kiK + (xOi + f (i)
t1
j=1, j≠i
−j
i−j )h(K∥mW∥AOSID)
mod q. In other words, they cannot achieve a collusion
attack successfully.
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Security features Tzeng et al. Hsu et al. Bao et al. Kang et al. Our scheme
Scheme can resist frame attacks. No No Yes Yes Yes
Scheme can resist insider attacks. No Yes No Yes Yes
Scheme can resist collusion attacks. Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Scheme satisfies the property of proxy protection. No No Yes Yes Yes
Scheme satisfies the property of unforgeability. No No Yes Yes Yes
Scheme satisfies the property of non-repudiation. No No Yes Yes Yes
At least t1 original signers can delegate the signing capability. No No No Yes Yes
At least t2 proxy signers can generate valid proxy signature. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
At least t3 original signers can verify the validity of proxy signature. No Yes No Yes Yes
Scheme requires a secure channel. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Each user determines his private and public keys. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SDC determines group private and public keys. Yes Yes No No No
Proxy group has private and public keys. Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Verifier group has private and public keys. Yes Yes Yes Yes No
The original signer’s private key cannot be derived from any information. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The proxy signer’s private key cannot be derived from any information. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The verifiers’s private key cannot be derived from any information. Yes Yes No Yes Yes
The partial proxy signature cannot be generated by others. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes• Secondly, assume that t1 − 1 or fewer original
signers of group GO conspire to derive the original
group key and each original signer’s secret key. They
have to reconstruct the polynomial function, f (x) =n1
i=1 fi(x)mod p, and compute the original group se-
cret key, XO = f (0) and each original signer Oj’s secret
shadow f ( j). But, the secret polynomial function, f (x),
can only be reconstructed by at least t1 original signer’s
secret shadows f ( j). Therefore, our new scheme can re-
sist the collusion attack made by any t1−1 or less orig-
inal signers.
From what has been analyzed in (i) and (vii), we are
fully certain that the requirements of secrecy and (t1, n1)
threshold delegating are fulfilled in our scheme.
(viii) At last, in our new scheme, there are the designated
warrant mW , the identities of the actual original signer’s
AOSID and the identities of the actual proxy signer’s
APSID. Furthermore, all verifiable equalities consist of
mW , AOSID and APSID. As discussed in (iv), we know that
our scheme can resist a frame and adaptively chosen
warrant attacks. Thus, the verifier can be convinced that
warrant,mW , is published by the original signers and that
mW records the stipulated period of this proxy,which pro-
vides the time constraint. Therefore, our new scheme sat-
isfies non-repudiation, unforgeability, verifiability, time
constraint, known signers, etc.
We have compared the security of the new proposed scheme
with the previous schemes, and summarized the result in
Table 1.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have demonstrated a security leak inherent
in Hsu et al.’s scheme [10] to show that their scheme violates
the claimed security requirements of proxy protection and
unforgeability. Further, we have proposed a new efficient and
secure non-repudiable threshold multi-proxy multi-signature
scheme with shared verification.Acknowledgment
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